





















2003	 to	 document	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 criminal	 justice.	 First,	 during	 this	 period,	 and	 after	
controlling	 for	 very	 precise	 description	 of	 the	 offenses	 as	 well	 as	 other	 observable	
characteristics,	 women	 get	 prison	 sentences	 15	 days	 shorter	 than	 men	 on	 average.	 This	




affected	 by	 the	 judges'	 gender	 but	 not	 the	 prosecutors'	 gender.	 Using	 the	 evolution	 of	










Does	 the	 judicial	 system	 treat	women	and	men	equally?	Gender	has	been	proved	 to	be	a	
support	 for	 extensive	 discrimination	 in	 different	 social	 mechanisms,	 including	 grading	 at	
school	and	firm	promotion.	Biases	are	mainly	to	the	disadvantage	of	women.	The	treatment	
of	 the	 sexes	 by	 the	 judicial	 system	 seems	 to	 differ	 from	 the	 prior	 observations.	Men	 are	
more	likely	to	be	arrested	by	the	police	and	then	to	be	sent	to	court.	Their	sentences	are,	on	
average,	of	a	longer	duration.	Those	facts	tend	to	characterize	a	bias	against	men.	This	rapid	






In	2010,	 in	France,	women	represented	10.5%	of	convicted	persons	 for	 the	most	common	

















gap	 within	 police	 and	 judicial	 administration.	 Indeed,	 the	 regalian	 power	 of	 the	 state	 is	
traditionally	devoted	to	men.	 In	both	England	and	France,	women	represent	between	20%	
and	30%	of	the	police	forces4.	Among	judges,	women	represent	only	25%	of	the	workforce	in	
England	and	25%	of	the	federal	 judges	 in	the	US5.	The	situation	 is	much	more	balanced	 in	
France,	where	women	are	more	numerous	than	men.	However,	this	evolution	is	recent	(the	
profession	was	only	opened	 to	women	 in	1946),	and	women	are	still	underrepresented	 in	
high-ranking	positions.	This	gap	could	be	partly	responsible	for	the	differences	in	conviction	
probability	and	sentences	between	men	and	women.	 Indeed,	men	and	women	have	been	
shown	 to	 judge	differently	 in	 some	 specific	 cases	 (e.g.,	 Fischer	 1997,	Boyd	Epstein	Martin	
2009),	and	they	probably	react	differently	to	defendants’	characteristics.	
	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	 first	 quantify	 and	 then	 try	 to	 understand	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	
sentencing.	 I	 rely	 on	 two	 different	 administrative	 datasets	 from	 the	 French	 Ministry	 of	
Justice.	The	first	one	contains	all	convictions	for	crime	in	France	from	2000	to	2003.	For	each	
conviction,	 the	 dataset	 contains	 precise	 information	 on	 crime	 type	 –	 a	 1400-cell	
nomenclature	that	 in	turn	contains	all	possible	cases	provided	for	by	the	 law	–,	sentences,	
criminal	 record,	 dates,	 place,	 procedural	 mechanisms	 and	 some	 socio-demographic	
variables:	age,	sex	and	nationality.	The	second	dataset	gives	the	gender	composition	of	the	
























men	 tend	 to	 commit	 the	 most	 severe	 offense	 within	 each	 (small)	 category.	 In	 order	 to	
overcome	this	problem,	this	paper	document	the	gender	gap	among	group	of	two	offenders	





It	 is	 still	 possible	 that	 responsibilities	 diverge	 among	members	 of	 the	 group.	 Indeed,	 the	




situations,	women	have	 “worse”	 observable	 characteristics	 and	we	 can	 reasonably	 expect	
that	 the	man	 is	 less	 frequently	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 group.	 Even	 if	 the	 gender	 gap	 is	 either	




If	 the	previous	 results	 are	driven	by	unobserved	heterogeneity	between	men	and	women	
(e.g.,	 family	 situation,	 professional	 status,	 academic	 level),	 the	 differences	 in	 sentencing	
should	not	be	affected	by	 the	 sex	of	 the	 judges.	On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 the	 size	of	 the	gap	 is	
affected	 by	 the	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 court,	 it	 will	 reinforce	 the	 hypothesis	 of	





(around	10%	of	 the	gender	gap).	Prosecutors	do	not	 seem	 to	affect	differences	neither	 in	
sentences	 nor	 in	 pre-trial	 decisions.	 This	 result	 is	 coherent	 with	 previous	 literature	 that	
focused	on	criminal	justice	in	the	US	and	used	a	very	similar	approach	(Schanzenbach	2005),	
along	 with	 several	 papers	 in	 education	 (Carrell	 Page	West	 2009;	 Boring	 2015)	 and	 labor	
economics	 (Kunze	Miller	 2014).	 This	 literature	 demonstrates	 that	 women	 tend	 to	 be	 less	
affected	by	gender,	even	when	this	means	being	harsher	on	women.	
	
This	 paper	 provides	 evidence	of	 a	 distorted	 treatment	 of	men	 and	women	by	 the	 judicial	
system.	Though,	the	results	cannot	be	interpreted	in	terms	of	discrimination	so	far.	Indeed,	
the	harshness	of	 sanction	could	be	different	–	 for	example	 if	prison	 for	women	are	worse	
than	 prison	 for	men	 –	 and	 the	 specific	 deterrence	 effect	 could	 also	 be	 different	 –	 if	 one	
prison	day	has	more	effect	on	women’s	 recidivism	 than	 it	has	on	men’s	 recidivism.	Those	




This	paper	 stands	at	 the	 frontier	of	 two	different	areas	of	 literature.	 The	 first	one	 follows	
Becker’s	 seminal	book	on	discrimination	 (Becker	2010)	and	 is	devoted	 to	gender	biases	 in	
different	 social	 areas.	 The	 two	most	 dynamic	 fields	 are	 education	 and	 labor.	 In	 a	 setting	
close	 to	 the	 last	 one	 used	 here,	 Kunze	 and	Miller	 (2014)	 use	 Norwegian	 data	 on	 private	
employment	 to	document	 the	 fact	 that	women	have	 fewer	 chances	 to	be	promoted	 than	
men	 do.	 More	 precisely:	 chances	 are	 higher	 when	 there	 are	 more	 women	 at	 the	 next	
hierarchical	 level	 but	 are	 lower	 when	 there	 are	 more	 women	 at	 the	 same	 rank.	 On	 the	




performance.	 They	 show	 that	 the	 gender	 gap	 disappears	when	 teachers	 are	women.	 This	
effect	 is	partly	reversible.	Using	students’	evaluations	of	the	teachers,	Boring	(2014)	shows	
that,	 after	 controlling	 for	 performance,	 women	 obtain	 lower	 scores	 than	 their	 male	
colleagues	do.	This	discrimination	is	more	present	among	male	students.	
	
The	 second	 related	 literature	 follows	 Becker	 seminal	 paper	 on	 the	 economics	 of	 crime	
(Becker	 1968)	 and	 is	 devoted	 to	 optimal	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 bias.	 Several	 papers	 have	










of	 the	 gender	 gap	 among	 defendants	 has	 been	 addressed	 (Mustard,	 2001;	 Starr,	 2015;	
Depew	et	al	2016)	in	the	US	context.	As	in	the	present	work,	the	author	shows	that	women	
are	less	frequently	convicted	and	are	less	severely	sentenced	when	they	are	convicted.		Starr	
(2015)	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 pre-trial	 decisions.	 In	 particular,	
controlling	 for	 arrest	 offense,	 charges	 are	 less	 severe	 for	 women.	 Glaeser	 and	 Sacerdote	
(2003)	also	show	that	the	victims’	gender	matters.	In	vehicular	homicides,	offenders	who	kill	
women	 get	 59%	 longer	 sentences	 and	 offenders	who	 killed	 black	 people	 get	 60%	 shorter	
sentences.	
	




judge	 is	a	woman	and	 that	 racial	minorities	are	 less	discriminated	against	when	 the	 judge	
also	 is	 of	 a	 racial	 minority.	 He	 interprets	 the	 first	 result	 as	 the	 sign	 of	 paternalistic	 bias	
among	male	judges.	
	
This	paper	replicates	some	results	 from	previous	studies	on	gender	gap	 in	criminal	 justice.	
Moreover,	 compared	 to	 the	 existing	 literature,	 it	 innovates	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 it	 uses	 a	
	 6	
simple	 measure	 of	 sentence	 heterogeneity	 within	 criminal	 groups	 –	 here	 duos.	 This	
procedure	 could	 easily	 be	 replicated	 for	 other	 questions	 such	 as	 racial	 bias.	 Second,	 it	
extends	the	work	done	by	Schanzenbach	(2005)	to	include	the	effect	of	prosecutors’	gender6.	
In	 addition	 to	 those	 innovations,	 this	 paper	 measure	 gender	 gap	 in	 a	 new	 institutional	
context.	
	



















that	 judge	 the	 infraction	 studied	 in	 this	paper	are	 composed	of	 three	professional	 judges.	
The	French	criminal	code	foresees	an	accelerated	procedure,	which	is	similar	to	the	normal	
one	except	that	the	investigation	term	is	extremely	short	(less	than	a	week).	The	prosecutor	






























same	 pool	 of	 judges.	 Cases	 heard	 according	 to	 accelerated	 procedure	 are	 attributed	 to	
different	pools	of	judges	in	accordance	with	the	date	of	the	facts.	
	
Jurisdictions	 are	 organized	 in	 several	 “chambers”	 responsible	 for	 the	 judgment	 of	 one	 or	
several	types	of	crime.	The	head	of	the	jurisdiction	organize	the	work	on	a	semester	basis.	A	




In	 the	 largest	 courts,	 there	 are	 specific	 hearings	 for	 the	 cases	 heard	 according	 to	 the	
accelerated	 procedure.	 Those	 hearings	 are	 characterized	 by	 a	 high	 turnover	 and	 judges	
usually	rotate	every	week.	A	case	heard	according	to	the	accelerated	procedure	is	officially	
attributed	 to	one	of	 those	specific	hearings	 in	accordance	with	 the	date	of	 the	end	of	 the	




1,800	 prosecutors15	hired	 through	 a	 common	 competitive	 exam.	 They	 can	 change	 from	
judge	 to	 prosecutor	 and	 vice-versa	 at	 different	 times	 during	 their	 career.	 Even	 if	 the	
frequency	is	not	clearly	defined,	judges	and	prosecutor	are	obliged	to	move	frequently	from	










service	of	 the	French	Ministry	of	 Justice	 (Sous	Direction	de	 la	Statistique	et	des	Etudes).	 It	








contains	 the	date,	 place,	 and	procedural	 detail	 of	 the	 trials;	 the	date	of	 the	 crime	and	 its	







Descriptive	 statistics	 for	 all	 men	 and	 women	 convicted	 between	 2000	 and	 2003	 are	
presented	in	the	left	part	of	table	1	(column	1	to	4).	The	demographic	characteristics	of	the	
two	sexes	are	slightly	different:	women	are	older	and	more	frequently	French	than	men	are.	
Criminal	 careers	 diverge	 largely:	 32%	of	men	have	 already	been	 convicted	 in	 the	 last	 two	
years	while	only	17%	of	the	women	have.	This	 is	 important	since	past	conviction	 is	one	of	
the	most	important	aggravating	factors16.		
	
The	 infractions	 committed	 are	 not	 as	 different	 as	 one	would	 expect.	 The	 share	 of	 violent	
crime	 is	 almost	 equal	 (16%	 vs	 15%),	 even	 if	men	 are	 usually	 viewed	 as	more	 violent.	 The	
main	differences,	 regarding	 crime	 types,	 come	 from	 robbery	and	 road-related	 crimes.	 The	
former	is	predominant	among	female	offenders,	but	the	latter	is	more	frequent	among	men.	
This	 structure	 is	 important	because	 robbery	 is	 considered	a	more	severe	crime	 than	 road-
related	crime	and	is	more	severely	punished.	Regarding	the	severity	of	the	crime	–	measured	
by	the	longest	sentence	allowed	by	the	criminal	code	–	the	differences	between	women	and	




Even	 if	 the	 aggregate	 characteristics	 of	 the	 crimes	 are	 not	 extremely	 different,	 the	 trials’	
outcomes	 are.	 From	 a	 procedural	 point	 of	 view,	 women	 are	 judged	 after	 longer	
investigations	(30%	longer),	and	they	are	rarely	sentenced	after	accelerate	procedure	(trial	






Women’s	 sentences	 are	 less	 severe.	 Prison	 and	 probation	 are	 less	 used	 against	 women	
(prison	is	13%	less	frequent	and	probation	3%	less	frequent).	Regarding	quanta,	prison	and	
probation	 sentences	 are	 shorter	 (18	 days	 shorter	 for	 prison	 and	 4	 days	 shorter	 for	
probation)	and	suspended	prison	sentences	are	longer	(8	days)	for	women.		
	






















Men	 and	 women	 receive	 different	 sentences,	 even	 after	 controlling	 for	 a	 large	 set	 of	
covariates	 that	 includes	very	precise	crime	categories.	This	gap	could	have	several	origins:	




To	 further	 investigate	 the	 gender	 gap,	 this	 section	 documents	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 mixed	




The	 sample	used	 in	 this	 section	 is	a	 specific	 subsample	of	 the	main	database.	Gender	gap	
among	 criminal	 groups	 can	 be	 different	 from	 the	 one	 observed	 in	 the	 general	 case	 as	
observed	by	 Starr	 (Starr,	 2015,	 p10).	 Then,	 the	external	 validity	of	 this	 exercise	 is	 limited.	






People	 will	 be	 considered	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 criminal	 group	 if	 they	 have	 been	
convicted	 for	 a	 crime	 that	 they	 committed	 together.	 This	 information	 is	 not	 directly	
registered	in	the	dataset,	as	there	is	no	ID	per	criminal	case	but	per	individual.	However,	the	






To	 identify	 the	 composition	of	 the	 criminal	 groups,	 I	 proceed	as	 follows.	 First,	 I	 only	 keep	
people	 who	 have	 been	 convicted	 for	 crimes	 committed	 "in	 group".	 Then,	 I	 am	 sure	 that	

















interest.	Second,	a	 large	proportion	of	 the	"false	matches”	are	probably	 real	matches	 that	
have	 been	 rejected	 from	 the	 main	 data	 set	 because	 of	 the	 strict	 criteria.	 For	 example,	
approximately	 26.2%	 of	 the	 matches	 are	 found	 in	 the	 categories	 "robbery	 with	 two	
aggravating	 circumstances"	 and	 "violence	 with	 two	 aggravating	 circumstances".	 Further,	





that	 comprise	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 sample.	 Over	 the	 2000-2003	 period,	 I	 find	 2,382	
mixed	duos	regrouping	4,764	offenders	(2,382	women	and	2,382	men).		
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 different	 offenders	 of	 each	 group	 are	 convicted	 for	 the	
same	main	crime.	Groups	in	which	offenders	get	different	charges	are	excluded.	In	particular,	
groups	in	which	one	person	is	convicted	for	“failure	to	assist	a	person	in	danger”,	“assistance	
to	 commit	a	 crime”,	 “non	denunciation”,	etc.	 are	excluded21.	Groups	 in	which	women	are	
charged	 for	 less	 severe	 crime	 even	 when	 crimes	 are	 similar	 are	 excluded	 and,	 then,	 the	
gender	gap	is	measured	net	of	the	disparities	in	the	charging	decision.		
	
Descriptive	 statistics	 of	 these	 groups	 are	 presented	 in	 table	 1,	 column	 5	 to	 8.	 In-group	



























than	 85%	 receive	 the	 same	 probation	 time.	 This	 is	 partly	 because	 some	 of	 the	 duos	 are	









The	 same	picture	emerges	 from	 the	analysis	 of	 the	 type	of	 sentence	used	 (instead	of	 the	
quanta).	Figure	2	presents,	for	each	type	of	sentence,	the	proportion	of	duos	in	which	none	
of	the	offenders	gets	prison	(resp.	probation	or	suspended	prison),	both	offenders	get	prison	
(resp.	probation	or	suspended	prison),	only	 the	man	gets	 it	or	only	 the	woman	gets	 it.	No	
one	 gets	 prison	 in	 64.4%	of	 the	 cases;	 both	 get	 it	 in	 17.5%	of	 the	 cases;	 only	 the	man	 in	
15.7%	of	the	cases	and	only	the	woman	in	2.4%	of	the	cases.	Then,	the	man	is	frequently	the	




	 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! = 𝜎! + 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋! + 𝜀		 (2)	
	
where	𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!	is	the	outcome	variable	(e.g.,	prison	day,	probation	day)	of	person	i	who	
belongs	 to	 group	 g;	𝜎!	are	 group	 fixed	 effects	 (2383	 dummies);	𝑠𝑒𝑥! 	is	 a	 dummy	 equal	 to	
one	if	i	is	a	woman;	and	𝑋!  is	a	set	of	control	variables	(i.e.,	age,	age	square,	past	convictions,	
nationality,	 criminal	 career).	 Contrarily	 to	 date,	 place	 or	 crime	 type	 –	 that	 are,	 by	







that	 are	 38	 days	 shorter	 (50%	 decrease	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 average	 prison	 sentence),	
probation	sentences	that	are	3	days	shorter	(11%	decrease)	and	suspended	prison	sentences	
that	are	10	days	 longer	than	men	receive	(21%	increase).	Men	have	a	higher	chance	to	be	







When	a	crime	 is	 committed	 in	a	group,	 judges	are	 supposed	 to	punish	 the	offenders	who	
have	the	largest	responsibility	more	severely.	If	men	are	more	often	the	leaders	of	the	duos	
or	frequently	commit	a	larger	share	of	the	crime	(e.g.,	sell	more	drugs,	land	more	punches),	
this	 could	explain	 the	pattern	observed	 in	 the	 last	 subsection.	Note	 that	 this	difference	 in	





The	 leadership	 among	 the	 group	 is	 not	 identifiable	 in	 the	 data	 and	 I	 cannot	 rule	 out	 the	





The	 first	 characteristic	 I	 use	 is	 the	 number	 of	 charges.	 By	 construction,	 the	main	 crime	 is	
identical	within	groups	but	offenders	could	also	be	convicted	for	other	crimes.	For	example,	
two	persons	could	commit	a	burglary	together	but	it	is	possible	that	only	one	is	responsible	
for	 selling	 the	 stolen	 goods.	 Among	 non	mixed	 groups,	 the	 offender	who	 is	 convicted	 for	
more	crimes	than	the	other	gets	longer	prison	time	in	30%	of	the	case	while	the	contrary	is	
true	 in	 only	 11%	 of	 the	 cases	 (appendix	 B	 figure	 B1).	 Then,	 the	 characteristic	 “being	
convicted	for	more	crimes	than	the	peer”	is	clearly	associated	with	harsher	sentences.	
	
Among	 duos	 where	 women	 are	 convicted	 to	 more	 charges	 than	 men	 (136	 duos)22,	 the	
proportion	in	which	women	receive	higher/equal/shorter	sentences	is	presented	in	figure	3a.	
Men	 receive	 longer	 prison	 sentences	 than	women	 do	more	 frequently	 than	 the	 contrary.	
The	 lag	 between	 those	 two	 situations	 decreases	 –	 compared	 to	 the	 results	 observed	 in	
figure	1	–,	but	the	former	is	still	2.5	times	more	frequent	than	the	latter	(25%	vs	9.6%).	On	
the	contrary,	women	receive	longer	suspended	prison	sentences	more	frequently.	When	the	






The	 second	 characteristic	 I	 use	 is	 criminal	 record.	 Among	 non	 mixed	 groups,	 when	 one	
offender	 has	 been	 convicted	more	 frequently	 than	 the	 other	 he	 receives	 a	 longer	 prison	
sentence	 29.9%	 of	 the	 time	 and	 a	 shorter	 prison	 sentence	 only	 7.5%	 of	 the	 time	 (see	
appendix	 B,	 graph	 B2).	 Probation	 time	 is	 also	 frequently	 longer	 (11.3%	 vs	 7.5%)	 while	
probation	time	is	usually	shorter	(5%	vs.	23%).	
	







convicted	 to	 more	 crimes	 than	 the	 man	 and	 groups	 in	 which	 the	 woman	 has	 a	 longer	
criminal	career	than	the	man	–	are	presented	in	table	3.	The	number	of	crimes	convicted	is	
no	 longer	 used	 as	 a	 control	 variable	 in	 regressions	on	 the	 first	 subgroup	and	 the	 criminal	




While	 offenders	who	 are	 convicted	 to	more	 crimes	 or	 have	 longer	 criminal	 history	 in	 the	
group	 are,	 in	 general,	more	 severely	 punished	 than	 their	 co-offender,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	
among	 mixed	 group	 when	 the	 woman	 have	 those	 characteristics.	 	 Women	 who	 are	
convicted	 to	 more	 numerous	 crimes	 are	 still	 less	 severely	 punished.	 Those	 with	 longer	
criminal	history	get	sentences	similar	to	their	male	co-offender.	Men	could	still	be	leaders	of	
the	 group	 or	 frequently	 present	 some	 unobserved	 characteristics	 that	 induced	 higher	
sentences	 (or	 do	 not	 present	 some	 characteristics	 related	 with	 shorter	 sentences	 like	
children	 or	 job).	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 gender	 gap	 does	 not	 reverse	 and	 sometimes	







to	 unobserved	 heterogeneity	 even	 if	 this	 is	 unlikely	 considering	 the	 high	 homophily	 rate	








In	 this	 section,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 court.	 This	 dimension	 is	 a	 priori	
orthogonal	 to	 the	 offenders’	 characteristics.	 If	 we	 observe	 differences	 in	 gender	 gap	







of	 2000	 and	 200324.	 For	 those	 two	 years,	 I	 gather	 data	 on	 the	 175	 first	 court	 instances.	 I	
compute	data	on	the	sex	of	the	presidents	of	the	court;	sex	of	the	state	prosecutor	(the	chief	
of	 the	 prosecutors	 in	 the	 court);	 number	 of	 judges	 (excluding	 examining	 magistrate	 and	















The	 simplest	 identification	 strategy	 would	 rely	 on	 the	 variations	 in	 courts’	 gender	
composition	per	years	and	places.	I	would	then	measure	the	effect	by	running	regressions	of	
the	following	form:	
	 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! + 𝛼! ∗% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,!+ 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! ∗% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,!	+𝛽 ∗ 𝑋!,!,! + 𝜀	 	 	 	 (3)	
	





















This	 strategy	 is	 valid	 only	 if	women,	whether	 judges	 or	 prosecutors,	 are	 randomly	 spread	
among	 time	 and	 jurisdictions.	 If	 the	 proportion	 of	women	 in	 the	 court	 is	 correlated	with	
offenders’	 characteristics	 then	 the	 previous	 equation	 will	 lead	 to	 biased	 estimates.	 This	
problem	could	be	tested	for	the	two	sources	of	identification.		
	
The	 correlation	 between	 the	 proportion	 of	 women	 in	 the	 court	 and	 observable	
characteristics	 of	 the	 offenders	 is	 presented	 in	 appendix	 C.	 It	 appears	 that	 gender	
composition	 of	 the	 court	 is	 correlated	 with	 several	 observable	 characteristics	 of	 the	






coherent	with	 the	 idea	 that	 those	 temporal	 variations	 are	mainly	 due	 to	 judges’	 rotation.	
Then,	 within	 courts	 variation	 in	 the	 gender	 composition	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 better	 source	 of	
identification.	
	
As	 variation	among	 jurisdiction	 is	 correlated	with	 the	 gender	 gap,	 I	 turn	 to	 a	model	using	
changes	 over	 time	 as	 the	 unique	 source	 of	 identification.	 I	 neutralize	 variations	 among	
courts	by	adding	places*sex	fixed	effects.	I	then	use	a	regression	of	the	following	form:	















Firstly,	 women	 could	 judge	 men	 and	 women	 differently	 and	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap	 by	
changing	 the	 average	 sentences.	 Secondly,	 the	 share	 of	 women	 could	 affect	 all	 judges’	









can	 see	 in	 the	 first	 line,	 the	 sex	of	 the	 judges	does	not	 affect	 the	average	 sentences.	 The	
point	 estimates	 are	 small	 and	 non-significant.	 Women	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 harsher	 “in	
general”.	
	
However,	 as	 presented	 in	 line	 4	 (“Woman	 *	 Prop	 women	 judge”),	 the	 share	 of	 women	
among	 judges	 does	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap.	When	 it	 increases,	 offenders	 who	 are	women	












family	–	and	 that	 female	 judges	are	not	as	attentive	 to	 those	characteristics	as	 their	male	
colleagues.	Even	 if	 this	hypothesis	cannot	be	 refuted	so	 far,	 the	hypothesis	of	a	distortion	
based	 on	 sex	 remains	more	 parsimonious.	 These	 results	 are	 similar	 to	 those	 obtained	 by	
Schanzenbach	 (2005)	 and	 Starr	 (2015)	 in	 the	 US	 context.	 Schanzenbach	 interprets	 this	





appendix	 D).	 Women	 seem	 to	 be	 less	 “tolerant”	 (or	 harsher)	 than	 men	 with	 violence	
committed	by	women.	 Interestingly,	 the	effect	of	 judges’	 sex	 is	more	 important	on	young	










Prosecutors	 could	 also	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap.	 Firstly,	 they	 could	 select	 different	 charges,	















Results	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 first	 column	 of	 table	 5.	 Based	 on	 this	 (imperfect)	 measure,	
women’s	 charges	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 sex	 of	 the	 prosecutor.	 The	 point	





detention	 (column	 3);	 number	 of	 days	 under	 pre-trial	 detention	 (column	 4).	 Prosecutor’s	
gender	 does	 affect	 women’s	 probability	 to	 be	 convicted	 after	 accelerated	 procedure	 but	
does	not	affect	pre-trial	detention.	A	one-standard-deviation	increase	in	the	share	of	women	
among	 prosecutor	 decreases	 the	 proportion	 of	 accelerated	 procedures	 for	 women	 by	
roughly	0.5%.	
	





All	 in	 all,	 the	 sex	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap	 observed	 in	
criminal	 justice.	 This	 could	 be	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 main	 discretionary	 power	 of	 the	
prosecutor	is	to	decide	if	the	person	should	be	sued	or	not	and	which	charges	should	be	hold.	
Those	 decisions	 are	 hard	 to	 study	 with	 the	 database	 used	 in	 this	 article	 –	 even	 if	 some	
evidence	 goes	 against	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 an	 impact	 of	 prosecutor’s	 gender.	 However,	 it	 is	
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	 Women	 Men	 Women	 Men	
		 Mean	 Sd	 Mean	 Sd	 Mean	 Sd	 Mean	 Sd	
Age	 35.5	 12.1	 33.1	 12	 29.6	 10	 30.6	 9.9	
French	 .89	 .31	 .86	 .34	 .77	 .42	 .74	 .44	
Past	conviction	 .17	 .37	 .32	 .47	 .21	 .41	 .35	 .48	
Crime	type	
Robbery	 .37	 .48	 .27	 .44	 .65	 .48	 .65	 .48	
Road	 .25	 .43	 .37	 .48	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Economy	 .08	 .27	 .04	 .19	 .02	 .12	 .02	 .12	
Violence	 .15	 .36	 .16	 .37	 .15	 .36	 .15	 .36	
Drug	 .04	 .19	 .06	 .24	 .15	 .35	 .15	 .35	
Insult	 .06	 .24	 .05	 .23	 .04	 .19	 .04	 .19	
Could	be	punished	by	a	maximum	of…	
1	year	 .14	 .35	 .13	 .34	 .02	 .14	 .02	 .14	
2	year	 .23	 .42	 .33	 .47	 .02	 .13	 .02	 .13	
3	year	 .32	 .47	 .22	 .41	 .11	 .32	 .11	 .32	
5	year	 .21	 .41	 .19	 .39	 .66	 .47	 .66	 .47	
more	than	5	years	 .1	 .3	 .13	 .34	 .19	 .39	 .19	 .39	
Pre-trial	detention	 .04	 .19	 .07	 .26	 .09	 .29	 .12	 .32	
Investigation	length	
(days)	 404	 573	 284	 465	 299	 468	 299	 468	
Accelerated	procedure	 .03	 .18	 .07	 .25	 .07	 .26	 .07	 .26	
Nb	of	conviction	 1.47	 .94	 1.54	 1.01	 1.7	 1.35	 1.73	 1.39	
Sentences	
Prison	(quantum)	 19	 100.9	 47.4	 163	 57.5	 218.6	 102.2	 309.9	
Probation	(quantum)	 25.9	 88.6	 29.9	 89.9	 26.2	 91.1	 30.4	 97.2	
Suspended	prison	
(quantum)	 36.6	 82.3	 28.2	 71.2	 53.2	 110	 39.7	 93.4	
Prison	(probability)	 .11	 .31	 .24	 .43	 .2	 .4	 .33	 .47	
Probation	(probability	 .15	 .36	 .18	 .38	 .13	 .33	 .14	 .35	
Suspended	prison	
(probability)	 .38	 .49	 .31	 .46	 .48	 .5	 .36	 .48	




















	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Dummy	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -37.93***	 -3.114*	 10.44***	 -0.0954***	 -0.00715	 0.0739***	
	
(4.212)	 (1.800)	 (1.964)	 (0.00828)	 (0.00704)	 (0.00931)	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Control	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Obs	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	
Mean	
sample	 79.88	 28.28	 46.47	 0.266	 0.135	 0.421	




























		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -99.00***	 -7.348	 34.32***	 -2.438	 2.287	 -9.276**	
	











	 	 	Observations	 272	 272	 272	 510	 510	 510	
Mean	sample	 133.6	 47.98	 54.32	 73.46	 32.38	 33.56	
Sd	sample	 400.5	 114.1	 105.8	 198.6	 85.25	 79.10		
Table	3:	Effect	of	gender	on	sentences	among	different	subtypes	of	mixed	groups.	
Woman	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	defendant	is	a	woman.	Controls	include:	group	fixed	














	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Dummy	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Prop	women	judge	 3.521	 -2.485	 0.316	 0.0106	 0.00279	 0.00726	
	
(3.349)	 (3.649)	 (2.488)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0191)	 (0.0267)	
Woman	*	Prop	
women	judge	
8.103**	 9.291***	 -8.717**	 0.0149	 0.0127	 -0.0534**	
(4.066)	 (3.197)	 (3.374)	 (0.0123)	 (0.0163)	 (0.0233)	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Control	variables	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Observations	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	
Mean	sample	 44.35	 28.97	 30	 0.225	 0.172	 0.324	
Sd	sample	 160.8	 88.90	 73.40	 0.418	 0.377	 0.468	
	
Table	4:	Effect	of	judges’	gender	composition	on	gender	gap.		
Woman	 is	 a	 dummy	equal	 to	 one	 if	 the	defendant	 is	 a	woman.	Prop	women	 judge	 is	 the	
proportion	 of	 women	 among	 judges	 (between	 0	 and	 1).	 Control	 variables	 are:	
courts*offender’s	sex	fixed	effects,	year,	month,	crime,	age,	nationality,	criminal	record.					














Day	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Day	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Prop	women	
prosecutor	
-9.652	 0.00287	 0.00310	 0.580	 -0.744	 1.898	 -2.158	
(15.04)	 (0.00786)	 (0.00540)	 (0.710)	 (2.115)	 (2.766)	 (1.723)	
Woman	*	Prop	
women	prosecutor	
-2.807	 -0.0205**	 5.05e-05	 -1.226	 -1.655	 1.945	 4.992**	
(22.23)	 (0.00899)	 (0.00538)	 (0.923)	 (2.430)	 (2.446)	 (2.288)	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	 	Control	variables	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	 	Observations	 729,285	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	
Mean	 1227	 0.0617	 0.0675	 7.311	 44.35	 28.97	 30	









Table	 A1	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 regressions	 of	 defendants’	 sex	 on	 different	 measure	 of	
sentences	after	controlling	for	the	observables.	Control	variables	include:	crime	type	(1395	
dummies),	place	(175	dummies),	time	(4	dummies	for	years,	12	for	months),	age,	age	square,	
past	 convictions,	nationality,	 type	of	procedure,	 criminal	 career.	 Infractions	 that	are	never	
sanctioned	 by	 prison,	 probation	 or	 suspended	 prison	 are	 dropped.	 In	 columns	 (1)	 to	 (3),	
offenders	 who	 were	 not	 convicted	 to	 prison	 (resp.	 probation,	 suspended	 prison),	 are	
considered	as	having	a	zero	day	sentence.	
Before	the	choice	of	a	sentence,	pre-trial	decision	could	also	be	affected	by	gender.	Some	
pre-trial	 decisions	 are	 registered	 in	 the	 database:	 severity	 of	 the	 charges,	 accelerated	
procedure,	 investigation	 length,	 pre-trial	 detention.	 The	 effect	 of	 defendants’	 gender	 on	
those	 variables	 is	 presented	 in	 table	 A2.	 The	 severity	 of	 the	 charges	 is	 captured	 by	 the	
longest	 possible	 sentence.	 As	 this	 is	 fully	 determined	 by	 the	 precise	 crime	 type,	 the	
regression	 presented	 in	 column	 (1)	 only	 includes	 control	 for	 large	 criminal	 categories	 (26	
dummies).	
Regressions	presented	in	table	A1	could	be	broken	down	by	subgroups,	especially	by	 large	
infraction	 categories.	 This	 is	 interesting	because	 crime	 controls	 are	more	or	 less	 stringent	
depending	on	 the	category.	 If,	 for	example,	 crime	severity	 could	vary	within	 the	“violence	










	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Dummy	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -15.27***	 1.069***	 1.392***	 -0.0778***	 0.00573***	 0.0354***	
	
(0.875)	 (0.325)	 (0.347)	 (0.00194)	 (0.00154)	 (0.00266)	




Control	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	




Constant	 -72.61***	 -8.855***	 28.79***	 -0.231***	 0.0410***	 0.538***	
	
(4.293)	 (1.921)	 (1.845)	 (0.00825)	 (0.0106)	 (0.0139)	























		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -60.52***	 -0.0130***	 24.16***	 -3.456***	
	
(3.230)	 (0.00227)	 (2.032)	 (0.278)	
	 	 	 	 	Control	 All	 All	 All	 All	
	 	 	 	 	Constant	 1,350***	 0.0549***	 -9.011	 -8.530***	
	
(16.39)	 (0.00472)	 (11.66)	 (0.672)	











		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
		 Robbery	 Road	 Violence	 Drug	 Under	30	 Above	30	
Prison	 		 		 		 		 		
	Sex	 -22.87***	 -4.280***	 -17.06***	 -55.52***	 -14.71***	 -16.56***	
	
(0.996)	 (0.162)	 (1.274)	 (5.989)	 (1.017)	 (0.925)	
Probation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sex	 2.553***	 -0.780***	 -5.966***	 13.18***	 0.922*	 0.186	




	 	Sex	 2.388***	 -2.410***	 -1.384*	 17.64***	 1.413***	 0.887**	
	

































Women	 Men	 Women	 Men	
		 		 Mean	 Mean	 Mean	 Mean	
	
Age	 29.15	 30.11	 29.14	 30.58	
	
French	 .82	 .76	 .7	 .61	
		 Past	conviction	 .26	 .38	 1	 .26	
	
Investigation	length	 296.76	 296.76	 238.76	 238.76	
		 Pre-trial	detention	 .15	 .13	 .11	 .13	
Type	of	crime	
Robbery	 .5	 .5	 .77	 .77	
Violence	 .19	 .19	 .1	 .1	
Drug	 .21	 .21	 .1	 .1	
		 Nb	of	conviction	 3.07	 1.76	 1.51	 1.49	
Sentence	
Prison	(quantum)	 98.16	 169.03	 72.03	 74.88	
Probation	(quantum)	 43.9	 52.06	 34.41	 30.35	
Suspended	prison	(quantum)	 72.57	 36.07	 28.06	 39.06	
Prison	(probability)	 .29	 .41	 .4	 .34	
Probation	(probability	 .24	 .23	 .21	 .15	
Suspended	prison	(probability)	 .45	 .38	 .27	 .4	
		 N	 136	 136	 255	 255	
	







		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	










		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
%	women	
judge	 -0.00646*	 -0.467	 -0.0561***	 54.55***	 0.0311***	 3.787***	 0.0201**	 0.0462*	
	
(0.00360)	 (0.336)	 (0.0149)	 (17.45)	 (0.00796)	 (0.869)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0236)	
Year=2003	 -0.000312	 -0.0449	 -0.00464**	 -1.169	 0.00760***	 0.194	 -0.00127	 0.0313***	
	
(0.000529)	 (0.0494)	 (0.00219)	 (2.568)	 (0.00117)	 (0.128)	 (0.00149)	 (0.00347)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	
Mean	 0.0954	 33.70	 0.904	 274.5	 0.0401	 5.568	 0.289	 1.506	
Sd	 0.0145	 1.342	 0.0617	 70.90	 0.0343	 3.586	 0.0408	 0.106	
	



















	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Diff	%	women	
judge		 -0.00104	 0.548*	 0.00715	 -13.89	 0.00912	 -0.187	 -0.00493	 -0.0346	
between	2000	
2003	 (0.00510)	 (0.308)	 (0.00751)	 (19.25)	 (0.00924)	 (0.960)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0310)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Obs	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	
Mean	sample	 -0.000391	 -0.127	 -0.0131	 -1.852	 0.0208	 0.606	 -0.00527	 0.0932	
Sd	sample	 0.0154	 0.949	 0.0227	 55.20	 0.0281	 2.896	 0.0333	 0.0927	
	





Appendix	D				 		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)			 		 Robbery	 Road	 Violence	 Drug	 Under	30	 Above	30		 	 		 	 	 		 	 		 Prop	women	judge	 1.249	 0.268	 1.358	 44.86*	 3.400	 4.610	Prison	 	 (5.923)	 (1.411)	 (6.341)	 (24.72)	 (3.868)	 (3.485)		 Woman	*	Prop	women	judge	 6.152	 1.797	 24.49*	 -6.390	 12.77**	 2.058			 (7.708)	 (2.068)	 (12.61)	 (64.17)	 (6.152)	 (4.848)		 Prop	women	judge	 -5.542	 -1.426	 -2.902	 3.128	 -1.993	 -2.985	Probation	 	 (5.547)	 (2.901)	 (6.906)	 (12.62)	 (4.269)	 (3.622)		 Woman	*	Prop	women	judge	 9.689*	 6.892**	 23.85**	 16.60	 6.719	 11.64**			 (5.425)	 (3.244)	 (11.88)	 (36.90)	 (4.733)	 (4.567)			 Prop	women	judge	 1.185	 1.574	 -1.896	 -1.596	 0.0373	 0.461	Suspended	 		 (3.001)	 (2.959)	 (5.383)	 (12.20)	 (2.882)	 (2.842)	prison	 Woman	*	Prop	women	judge	 -16.10**	 0.254	 -15.84*	 2.745	 -16.34***	 -4.088		 (7.019)	 (2.500)	 (8.925)	 (39.77)	 (5.525)	 (4.323)		 		 	 	 	 		 	 	N	Obs	 		 205,083	 248,015	 115,142	 42,565	 356,178	 353,539	Mean	prison	term	 61.93	 9.007	 58.23	 145.5	 46.61	 42.07	Sd	prison	term	 159.1	 38.51	 194.7	 369.1	 146.4	 174.1		
Table	D1:	Effect	of	judges’	gender	composition	on	gender	gap	depending	on	crime	type	or	
age.	Control	for	courts*offender’s	sex	fixed	effects,	year,	month,	crime,	age,	nationality,	
criminal	record.		
